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Abstract
Using differences-in-differences regression models, this research note tries to evaluate the effects of China’s 
anti-graft campaign on tourism in Macao. It finds that anti-corruption policies significantly curbed gambling 
with public money in Macao, causing a recent drop in Macao’s gaming revenue. Furthermore, the more strong-
ly the campaigns have been enforced, the less tourists go to the city of Macao. Macao is urged to diversify its 
casino-dominated and mainland China-dependent economy.
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ZusammenfassungUnter Verwendung von Differenz-von-Differenzen Regressionsmodellen versucht dieser Artikel die Auswirkun-gen der chinesischen Antikorruptionskampagne auf den Tourismus in Macao zu analysieren und zu bewerten. Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse und Bewertung wird festgestellt, dass die Anti-Korruptionsmaßnahmen das Glücksspiel in Macao erheblich gebremst haben, was kürzlich zu einem Rückgang der Glücksspieleinnahmen in Macao führte. Je stärker die Kampagnen durchgesetzt werden, desto weniger Touristen reisen nach Macao. Macao wird dringend aufgefordert, seine vom Kasino dominierte und von Festlandchina abhängige Wirtschaft 
zu diversifizieren.
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1.  IntroductionThe backbone of Macao’s economy is its gambling in-dustry, which generated approximately 360 billion Patacas (8 Patacas for approximately 1 US$) in 2013, which is seven times that of Las Vegas. In fact, the gaming sector accounted for 85% of Macao’s Gross Do-mestic Product, over 30% of its total employment, and nearly 90% of its government revenue (Macao Statis-
tics and Census Services 2013). Macao’s post-colonial 
economic miracle is mainly due to its gaming liberali-zation for foreign investors in 2002 and China’s Free Individual Travel Scheme. From 2004 to 2013, Macao had been experiencing spectacular economic growth of over 20% annually and was becoming one of the richest economies in the world. Since the 3rd quarter 2014, however, Macao’s major economic data have been falling, as shown in Table 1. In particular, per 
tourist spending declined for the first time since Ma-cao’s handover to China. The declining trend has been 
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obvious since the 2nd quarter 2015 with a significant decrease in tourist arrivals, gross gaming revenue and earnings before interest, taxes and amortization (Ma-
cao Statistics and Census Services 2015). Because the casino industry contributes the lion’s share to public revenue and remains by far the largest employer in the city, its downturn will ultimately have a negative effect on each and every branch and household in the city (Scheyvens 2011). 
Tourist arrivals 
(‘000 persons)
Year-on-year 
change
Per capita tourist 
spending
 (Patacas)
Year-on-year 
change
Gross Gaming 
Revenue
(million Patacas)
Year-on-year 
change 
3rd quarter 2014
4th quarter 2014
1st quarter 2015
2nd quarter 2015
8,245
 
7,997 
7,412
 
7,344 
-3.6% 
-3.3% 
-6.9% 
-7.9% 
1,878
 
1,757 
1,802 
1,668 
-1.4% 
-13.1% 
-20.2% 
-22.1% 
83,143
 
75,844
 
65,033
 
57,115 
-7%
 
-24.5%
 
-36.5% 
-37.4% 
Table 1 Changes in Major Economic Indicators. Source:  
 Authors’ calculations based on data from Ma- 
 cao Statistics and Census Services, Yearbook of  
 Statistics (2016: 157-175). Note: 8 Patacas for  
 approximately 1 US$
Table 2 Recent Macroeconomic Indicators. Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Macao Statistics and  
 Census Services, Yearbook of Statistics (2016: 365-384) 
A number of scholars have been conducting research on the dramatic decline of Macao’s gaming sector, identifying at least three factors that may have caused the drops in Macao’s gaming revenues. Firstly, it is ar-gued that the worldwide economic slowdown, and in particular that of China as Macao’s largest source of travelers, may have negatively affected Macao’s gam-ing market demand. In fact, the World Bank keeps ad-justing its economic growth forecast downwards. For example, while in July 2014, World Bank economists predicted an economic growth rate of 3% for 2015, they shrunk that predication to 2.6% in their De-cember 2014 press conference (Charemza and Ladley 2016). More seriously, the growth rate of the Chinese 
economy declined from over 10% in the first decade of the 21th century to merely 7% last year. Even worse, 
contrary to China’s official statistics, China’s real economic growth may have already turned negative, which can be deduced from its declining energy con-sumption and transportation turnover (Holz 2014). Macao is a very small economy with very limited re-sources, and its mono-economic structure makes it very dependent on the country that provides the ma-jority of its travelers. Consequently, any negative sign 
in the Chinese economy may cause significantly more compound volatility and recession in the city of Macao (Sheng 2014). In fact, GDP, gaming export and export of other tourism goods and services keep declining, as shown in Table 2, despite the fact that investment has been increasingly conducted to offset the negative outside impacts (Macao Statistics and Census Services 2015).
1st quarter 
2014 
2nd quarter 
2014 
3rd quarter 
2014 
4th quarter 
2014 
1st quarter 
2015
2nd quarter 
2015 
GDP
Gaming export
Tourism export
Investment
12.4% 
13.0% 
6.6% 
30.1% 
8.1% 
-0.5% 
10.4%
 
49.2% 
-2.1%
 
-12.3% 
-0.7% 
35.4% 
-17.2%
 
-28.9%
 
-15.7%
 
26.9% 
-24.5% 
-39.7%
 
-17.7%
 
30.9% 
-26.4%
 
-40.5% 
-21.5% 
2.9% 
46 DIE ERDE · Vol. 149 · 1/2018
Corruption and travel: effects of China’s anti-graft campaign on Macao
Secondly, increasing inter-destination gaming compe-tition may also contribute to Macao’s recent decline in the gaming sector. Macao’s economic success, induced 
by casino liberalization and massive inflow of main-land Chinese gamblers, has inspired its neighboring economies to follow their model. Singapore opened its two luxury casino resorts in 2010, primarily to compete with Macao for Chinese high rollers. It was a huge success, as shown in 10 million gaming tour-ist arrivals, which largely contributed to Singapore’s remarkable economic growth rate of 14.7% that year. In 2014, the city state surpassed Las Vegas to become the world’s second largest casino city next to Macao (Wu and Chen 2015). Following Singapore, casinos have been mushrooming in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Korea, and Russia. Taiwan and Japan are seriously considering pursuing gaming liberalization. Among the newly established casinos surrounding Macao, those located in the Philippines and Vietnam recorded the most remarkable growth at 50% annually, ‘stealing’ away a considerable number of high spending Chinese tourists and casino resort investors from Macao (Sheng and Zhao 2016). Thirdly, since 2012, China’s anti-graft movement may have negatively affected Macao casinos’ VIP busi-nesses and thus the overall performance of the Macao economy. Unlike Western casino cities, Macao’s gam-ing sector relies heavily on its high-spending gam-blers, who are estimated to contribute two-thirds of its total gaming revenue. It is also estimated that half 
of these high rollers are either government officials or state-owned enterprises’ managerial staff from main-land China, and they gamble with public money. In ad-dition, Macao casinos also play the role of money laun-derer for these state cadres allowing them to transfer their embezzled public money out of the country (Saha and Yap 2015). Since Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, however, a serious anti-corruption campaign has spread over the territory, and a large number of 
corrupt government officials have been put behind 
bars. Other officials who have escaped arrest are also reluctant to gamble in Macao, as the city is ultimately under the supervision of the central government de-spite its autonomous status. To further restrict money 
laundering and capital flight, the Chinese government forced the Macao Monetary Authority to forbid usage of Union Pay Cards (China’s largest credit card) in Ma-cao casinos, starting in July 2014. The total number of bets in Macao casinos declined dramatically once this regulation took effect. Furthermore, the Chinese gov-ernment forced the Macao Police Authority to restrict 
visas for Chinese transit visitors to Macao from 7 to 3 days, also starting in July 2014 (Sheng and Zhao 2016). These three factors are not necessarily mutually ex-clusive, nor do they make an exhaustive list of factors behind Macao gaming revenue drops. This research 
note focuses on the specific factor of China’s anti-corruption campaign, and we try to use quantitative methods to isolate and evaluate the relationship be-tween anti-corruption and tourist arrivals.
2.  Empirical Evidence from Macao
Chinese officials with financial support from the gov-ernment make up a sizable portion of Chinese tourism abroad. There is, however, no public data from China 
on officials travelling abroad. We make use of official statistics collected by the Macao government on the number of visitors from Chinese provinces. Note that only 23 provinces have data. The other provinces are not reported separately because of the small size of tourists from those places. To remove seasonal ef-fects, we calculate the year-on-year monthly growth rate of the number of visitors to Macao from each Chinese province in our data. Our panel data span 56 months (July 2011 to Feb 2016) for all 23 provinces in our data. The unit of analysis is month-province com-bination. In total, we have 1,288 observations. 
Many Chinese officials like to gamble in Macao. How-ever, the Macao government’s statistics do not report 
whether a Chinese visitor is a government official. Therefore, we have to use more sophisticated meth-ods to uncover the extent and mechanisms of Chinese 
officials travelling abroad. Our empirical strategy is based on key insights into the implementation of Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and their varied effects across Chinese provinces, which tend to have differ-ent impacts on Chinese tourists to Macao based on their province of origin. We use the differences-in-differences (DID) regression models to identify the effects of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on Macao 
tourism. The anti-corruption campaign was officially launched soon after Xi took the top ruling party posi-tion in November 2012. In the next month, Xi laid out 
the so-called ‘Eight Rules’ as a strict guide for official behavior. The core of the anti-corruption campaign – 
mass sacking of top officials – did not start until 2013 (Sullivan 2014). The anti-corruption campaign was not uniformly implemented across China. Some prov-inces, such as Beijing and Shanghai, only had one of-
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ficial at the level of deputy governor or above sacked from January 2013 to February 2016. On the other 
hand, Shanxi province had seven such officials sacked 
during the same period, according to an official media report. There is also a difference in timing. The earlier 
the first official was sacked in one province, the more 
officials tended to be sacked over time (see evidence below). We may use January 2013 as the beginning of the national anti-corruption campaign and compare the number of tourists from Chinese provinces to Macao 
before and after that date to obtain our first differenc-es. We can then use our two measures of the intensity of the campaign as second differences. Our DID mod-el, which estimates the impact of the anti-corruption campaign’s intensity on the drop in Chinese tourism’s 
growth rate in Macao after the campaign, is specified as follows: (1)
ΔVisitorpt = α1post + α2post×intensityp + Zptμ1 + λp + ept 
ΔVisitorpt is the year-on-year monthly growth rate of the number of visitors to Macao from Chinese prov-ince p in month t (from July 2011 to February 2016). The variable intensity measures the intensity of the implementation of the anti-corruption campaign in province p. We have two measures of intensity: Num-
berSacked (the number of officials being sacked at the deputy provincial governor level or above) and Month-
FirstSack (the month in which the first official at the deputy provincial governor level or above was sacked). 
Post is an indicator of the nominal start of the national anti-corruption campaign, post = 1 if t is after Decem-ber 2012, and post = 0 if t is on or before December 2012. Zpt is a vector of month dummies. We also include 
provincial fixed effects λp. We do not control for year dummies because they are perfectly correlated with 
post. Our main DID estimate for specification (1) is α2. 
Specification (1) does not fully exploit the panel data structure in our study because all provinces are as-sumed to experience the anti-corruption campaign at the same time – the only difference is that some prov-inces experienced a more intensive campaign than oth-
ers. Our second DID specification (2) makes full use of the panel data structure. We assume that the campaign was implemented earlier in some provinces than oth-ers. In other words, some provinces experienced longer exposure to the anti-corruption campaign. The regres-
sion is specified as:
(2)
ΔVisitorpt = βpostSackpt + Zptμ2 + γp + ϵpt  where postSackpt is an indicator of the start of the pro-vincial anti-corruption campaign, postSack = 1 if t is 
one or after the sacking of the first official at the dep-uty governor level or above, and post = 0 if t is before that date. A vector of month and year dummies is Zpt. 
We also include provincial fixed effects γp. Our main 
DID estimate for specification (2) is β. We have essentially used two qualitatively different DID models to study how China’s anti-graft campaign affects Macao. The classical DID model estimates the treatment effect by comparing the trend differences between a treatment and a control group. Consider one of the most famous DID studies by Card and Krue-
ger (1994). They aim to study the treatment effect of minimum wage on unemployment. They compared employment in the fast food sector in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania, in February 1992 and in November 1992, after New Jerseys’ minimum wage increase in 
April 1992. Here New Jersey is the treatment group, the raise of minimum wage is the treatment, and neighboring Pennsylvania is the control group. Card and Krueger (1994) only studied two states at two different points of time. A more general panel-data approach is to collect data for more states and more 
time periods. Our specification (2) follows exactly this more general panel-data approach. Under this ap-proach, a province can be either treated (when anti-corruption campaign has started in this province) or untreated (before the start of the campaign in this province). The treatment variable is binary (whether a policy is implemented or not). At each period, un-treated provinces serve as controls for other treated provinces. This way, we can build a DID model even if all provinces are eventually treated, as long as the date of treatment varies across provinces. 
Our specification (1) follows an entirely different DID approach. Suppose we give a group of patient differ-ent doses of the same drug at the same time. We have medical record both before and after the administra-
tion of the drug. Here we do not have a clean control 
group who do not receive any drug. However, we can still compare the trends of those who receive large dose to that of those who receive small dose of the same drug. Roughly speaking, the former is the treat-ment group, the latter is the control group. Precisely speaking, the treatment variable is continuous and we cannot unambiguously group our observations into 
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control and treatment groups. In our specification (1), different Chinese provinces receive different doses (or intensities) of the anti-corruption campaigns. We use two very different DID models so that we can give our results more credibility. In a truly ran-domized experiment, a researcher can evaluate the quality of the experiment by comparing the average characteristics of the control and treatment groups before the implementation of the treatment. There is no comparable way to test the validity of DID models. Our conclusion will be strengthened if two qualita-tively different DID models yield consistent results. Our conclusion will be challenged if either one of the two models fail to deliver the expected effect. 
MonthFirstSack
NumberSacked
VisitorGrowthDiff
Jan13 Jul14 Jan16
0
5
10
0 5 10
−.6
−.4
−.2
0
Figure 1 shows the relationship between three vari-ables at the provincial level: MonthFirstSack, Numb-
erSacked, and VisitorGrowthDiff, the latter of which 
is defined as the average ΔVisitor on and after Janu-
ary 2013 minus the average ΔVisitor before that date. There is a clear negative relationship between our two measures of anti-corruption campaign intensity: 
NumberSacked and MonthFirstSack. The longer is a province exposed to the anti-corruption campaign, 
the more officials were sacked in that province. Both of these variables are correlated to VisitorGrowth-
Diff, the measure of the decline in the growth rate of 
visitors to Macao. Provinces that had more officials sacked or exposed to the anti-corruption campaign for a longer period of time tend to have more decline in the growth rate of visitors to Macao.
Fig 1 The relationship between provincial anti-corruption campaign initiation, outcome, and the decline of travel to 
Macao. Source: Own elaboration, data source: Macao Statistics and Census Services 2014, 2015, authors’ own 
dataset compiled from official sources.
Note: NumberSacked is the number of officials being sacked at the deputy provincial governor level or above in a 
particular province; MonthFirstSack is the month in which the first official at the deputy provincial governor 
level or above was sacked; VisitorGrowthDiff is the year-on-year monthly growth rate of the number of visitors 
to Macao from a Chinese province.
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DID regression results confirm this graphical pat-tern. Table 3 reports the results from specification (2). Column 1 reports the result of specification 2 without adding any month or year dummies. The DID estimate  is -0.225, suggesting that provinces that were exposed to the anti-corruption campaign, relative to those that were not yet exposed to the campaign, on average have 22.5% lower growth rate in the number of visi-tors to Macao. If we add the year dummies but not the 
month dummies, the effect drops significantly. The DID estimate  is only -0.0787 (column 2). Further adding the month dummies does not change the DID estimate
 much further (= -0.06 in column 3). In all these re-sults, the estimated coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant at least at the 95% level. 
(1)
Δ Visitor
(2)
Δ Visitor
(3)
Δ Visitor
postSack 
year=2011 
year=2012 
year=2013 
year=2014 
year=2015 
year=2016 
Constant 
Month Eects
R2
Fixed Eects 
Observations 
-0.225*** 
  (0.0247) 
  0.218*** 
  (0.00886) 
  No 
  0.153 
  Yes 
  1288 
-0.0787*** 
  (0.0270) 
  0 
  (.) 
-0.289*** 
  (0.0335) 
-0.367*** 
  (0.0270) 
-0.242*** 
  (0.0323) 
-0.455*** 
  (0.0315) 
-0.551*** 
  (0.0379) 
  0.476*** 
  (0.0194) 
  No 
  0.367 
  Yes 
 1288 
-0.0600*** 
  (0.0278) 
  0 
  (.) 
-0.308*** 
  (0.0343) 
-0.388*** 
  (0.0283) 
-0.270*** 
  (0.0350) 
-0.490*** 
  (0.0349) 
-0.629*** 
  (0.0448) 
  0.539*** 
  (0.0248) 
  Yes 
  0.383 
  Yes 
 1288 
***p< .01
The estimated coefficients before the year dummies (with 2011 as the base year) are all negative and sta-
tistically significant at the 99% level (column 2 and 3), showing a clear declining trend in the growth rate of Chinese visitors to Macao, both before and after the introduction of the anti-corruption campaign at the end of 2012. If we do not control for the time trend (column 1), the estimated  tends to be overestimat-ed. After we control for the time trend (column 2 and 3), the estimated , which estimates  the decline in tourists to Macao from the provincial timing varia-tions of anti-corruption campaigns, becomes smaller 
yet still statistically significant.
Results based on specification (1) are consistent with 
what we discover using specification (2). In column 1-2 of Table 4, we report the results of specification (1) using NumberSacked as a measure of campaign inten-sity. Column 1 reports the results without controlling 
for month and provincial fixed effects. The estimated   coefficient is -0.0259, suggesting that a drop in the visitor growth rate tends to be larger in provinces 
where there are more officials being sacked. Column 2 reports the results controlling for month and pro-
vincial fixed effects. The effect on NumberSacked is ab-
sorbed by the provincial fixed effects. The estimated  
coefficient is unchanged at -0.0259. In column 3-4 of 
Table 2, we report the results using MonthFirstSack as a measure of campaign intensity. The estimated  co-
efficient is 0.00411 if we do not control for month and 
provincial fixed effects (column 3), suggesting that the drop in the visitor growth rate tends to be smaller in provinces less exposed to the anti-corruption cam-
paign. Adding the month and fixed provincial effects barely changed the results (column 4). In all the above cases, the estimated  coefficients are statistically 
significant at least at the 90% level. 
Table 3 The Effects of Chinese Provincial Anti-corrupti- 
 on Campaign Initiation on the Monthly Growth  
 of Travel to Macao. Source: Authors’ calculati 
 on based on data from Macao Statistics and  
 Census Services, Yearbook of Statistics (2016 )
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Table 4 The Effects of Chinese Provincial Anti-corruption Campaign Intensity on the  
 Monthly Growth of Travel to Macao. Source: Authors’ calculation based on  
 data from Macao Statistics and Census Services, Yearbook of Statistics (2016 )
(1)
Δ Visitor
(2)
Δ Visitor
(3)
Δ Visitor
(4)
Δ Visitor
post 
post × NumberSacked 
NumberSacked 
post × MonthFirstSack 
MonthFirstSack 
Constant 
Month Eects 
R2
Fixed Eects 
Observations 
-0.142*** 
  (0.0415) 
-0.0259* 
  (0.0150) 
  0.0261** 
  (0.0131) 
  0.210*** 
  (0.0376) 
  No 
  0.149 
  No 
  1288 
-0.137*** 
  (0.0421) 
-0.0259* 
  (0.0151) 
  0 
  (.) 
  0.264*** 
  (0.0175) 
  Yes 
  0.141 
  Yes 
  1288 
-2.896** 
  (1.344) 
  0.00411** 
  (0.00205) 
-0.00523*** 
  (0.00192) 
  3.697*** 
  (1.255) 
  No 
  0.154 
  No 
  1288 
-2.892** 
  (1.350) 
  0.00411* 
  (0.00206) 
  0 
  (.) 
  0.264*** 
  (0.0177) 
  Yes 
  0.135 
  Yes 
  1288 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p< .01
3. Concluding RemarksUsing two qualitatively different differences-in-dif-ferences regression models, in this research note, we attempt to measure the effects of China’s anti-
graft movement on Macao’s tourist inflows. We find relatively robust evidence that provinces that expe-rienced stronger anti-corruption campaigns started to send less tourists to Macao. The evidence lends support to the view that many Chinese tourists to Macao (at least before the campaign) were govern-
ment officials whose trips were not entirely financed by their own money. The anti-corruption campaigns were effective to some degree in curbing such corrup-
tive behaviors. However, there is no evidence that the decline in Macao’s tourism economy is entirely due to the anti-corruption campaign; the visitor growth rate had already started to decline before Xi’s campaign started. A combination of several factors contribute to the decline of visitors to Macao, and our paper deliv-ers relatively robust evidence that the anti-corruption campaign is at least one of the causes. 
As one of China’s two special administrative regions following China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ ideol-ogy, which experiments with the co-existence of capi-talism and socialism as well as a high degree of politi-cal autonomy under the Communist regime, Macao’s 
success has significant political value for the legitima-cy of Chinese leadership (Sheng and Tsui 2009). There-fore, the casino city has been gaining various types of support from the central government and govern-ments at all levels in China. As Macao, after more than a decade of rapid economic growth, steps into a wealthy and advanced welfare society, the Chinese authority gradually withdraws its special treatments of Macao, and recently it often concentrates on its own well-being instead of supporting Macao uncondition-ally. In particular, as a rather controversial sector, the casino boom in Macao, driven by foreign invest-ment, often gives mainland Chinese the impression that foreign capitalists use Chinese territory and earn Chinese money by corrupting Chinese government of-
ficials. The series of anti-corruption measures target-ing Chinese gamblers in Macao seem to be a response by Chinese government to this widespread opinion. 
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In general, tourism is a highly externally dependent 
sector that is vulnerable to any outside fluctuation: economic, social, environmental and political (Nel-
son 2012). To reduce potential risks, the government of Macao needs to seriously consider diversifying its economy, such as by revitalizing the high-value-added manufacturing industry; fostering medical, educa-tional and cultural sectors; and increasing the non-gaming aspects of Macao’s tourism industry.
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